The pcr selection which is passed with the --pcr parameter it not compared with the attest. So it's possible to fake a valid attestation.

References: https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools/commit/98599df9392a346216c5a059b8d35271286100bb

It was not checked whether the magic number in the attest is equal to TPM2GENERATEDVALUE. So an attacker could generate arbitrary quote data which was not detected by tpm2 checkquote.

References: https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools/commit/66d922d6547b7b4fe4f274fb2ec10b376e0e259c

A flaw was found in tpm2-tools in versions before 5.1.1 and before 4.3.2. tpm2import used a fixed AES key for the inner wrapper, potentially allowing a MITM attacker to unwrap the inner portion and reveal the key being imported. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality.

tpm2-tools versions before 1.1.1 are vulnerable to a password leak due to transmitting password in plaintext from client to server when generating HMAC.